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THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE:
THE IMPACT OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS ON THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM*
I.

INTRODUCTION

More than half of the jail and prison inmates in the United States have
a mental illness.1 As a result of the overrepresentation of individuals with
mental illness in the criminal justice system, state courts are examining
alternative options for meeting the challenges posed by the population of
offenders with mental illness.2 Individuals with mental illnesses are entering the criminal justice system at a disturbing frequency.3 As a result, the
criminal justice system has been forced to become a primary mental health
care provider, a function for which these facilities are ill-equipped.4 As
individuals with mental illness continue to flood the courtrooms of
America, many jurisdictions are looking at alternatives to provide diversions to incarceration.5
This note addresses the evolving area of therapeutic jurisprudence in
the context of problem-solving courts and, more specifically, examines the

*

Winner of the North Dakota Bar Foundation Outstanding Note/Case Comment Award.
1. DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO . 213600, MENTAL
HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006), available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf. More specifically, 705,600 state prison inmates,
78,800 federal prison inmates, and 479,900 local jail inmates have reported a mental health
problem. Id. Mental health problems reported include major depression and psychotic disorders
involving hallucinations and delusions. Id. at 2.
2. See DERECK DENCKLA & GREG BERMAN, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, RETHINKING THE
REVOLVING DOOR 7 (2001), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/_uploads/documents/
rethinkingtherevolvingdoor.pdf (indicating that state courts are realizing that “business as usual”
is not working for incarcerated mentally ill offenders).
3. See Mark R. Munetz & Jennifer L.S. Teller, The Challenges of Cross-Disciplinary
Collaborations: Bridging the Mental Health and Criminal Justice Systems, 32 CAP. U. L. REV.
935, 938-40 (2004) (discussing the prevalence of mental health problems among inmates in
prison). “[P]eople with mental illness are falling through the cracks of this country’s social safety
net and are landing in the criminal justice system at an alarming rate.” COUNCIL OF STATE
GOV’TS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE/MENTAL HEALTH CONSENSUS PROJECT xii (2002), available at
http://consensusproject.org/downloads/Entire_report.pdf [hereinafter CONSENSUS PROJECT].
4. MARCIA K. GOIN, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: REDIRECTING RESOURCES TOWARD TREATMENT, NOT CONTAINMENT 2
(2004), available at http://www.psych.org/edu/other_res/lib_archives/archives/ 200401.pdf.
5. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 6-7; see Christin E. Keele, Note, Criminalization
of the Mentally Ill: The Challenging Role of the Defense Attorney in the Mental Health Court
System, 71 UMKC L. REV. 193, 193 (2002) (explaining that problem-solving courts have gained
support from politicians and the public due to the troubling trend of individuals with mental
illness in the criminal justice system).
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development of mental health courts.6 Part II defines the concept of
therapeutic jurisprudence and problem-solving courts. In addition, Part II
examines the origins of the problem-solving court movement. Part III
analyzes the proliferation of mental health courts and discusses the structure
and function of these unique courts. Part IV provides insight into the
complex role of defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges involved in the
mental health court process. Part V explores the implementation of mental
health courts across the country, federal legislation relating to these courts,
and controversies surrounding the mental health court model. Finally, Part
VI examines some of the issues related to mentally ill offenders in North
Dakota and the possible impact of creating problem-solving courts.
II. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND PROBLEM-SOLVING
COURTS: A NEW APPROACH
A. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
Therapeutic jurisprudence refers to the study of how the law acts as a
therapeutic agent.7 Within this concept, procedures, rules, and the legal
roles that lawyers and judges play during the process of adjudication are all
social forces that create consequences.8 The concept of therapeutic
jurisprudence suggests that reducing the “anti-therapeutic consequences”
created by the law can be accomplished without “subordinating due process

6. See Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts, 30
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1055, 1055-56 (2003) (discussing the development of problem-solving
courts). Problem-solving courts are specialized court dockets that focus on addressing problems
that lead to criminal justice involvement such as drug abuse, mental illness, or domestic violence.
Id. Although by nature traditional courts are “problem-solving,” the problems focused on by
specialized problem-solving courts address underlying issues such as mental illness, drug abuse,
and domestic violence with the goal of preventing the defendant from re-offending. Id. at 1055.
The traditional court process focuses on the problem of past behavior, the crime that occurred, and
punishment of that behavior rather than on addressing how to keep the defendant from reoffending. Id. at 1055, 1060. An example of one of the first problem-solving courts is the
juvenile court created to address the problem of juvenile delinquency with a rehabilitative
approach rather than a punitive approach provided by the traditional adult criminal court. Id. at
1056. Mental health courts are specialized court dockets within the problem-solving court model
that focus on the mentally-ill offender. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 7.
7. GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR PROBLEM-SOLVING
JUSTICE 49-50 (2005) [hereinafter BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS] (citing LAW IN A
THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE xvii (David B. Wexler &
Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996)). Therapeutic jurisprudence has also been defined as the study of the
extent that the law affects the physical and psychological interests of individuals in a community.
Id. at 50.
8. Id. at 49-50; see JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND
THE COURTS 7-8 (Bruce J. Winick & David Wexler eds., 2003) (explaining that the “antitherapeutic consequences” relate to emotional and psychological issues confronted by the court in
some cases, and the affect that the court has on these issues).
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and other justice values.”9 The law’s impact on emotional well-being and
overall mental health relating to offender’s psychological needs becomes a
focus in the study of therapeutic jurisprudence.10
Further, therapeutic jurisprudence has been used to analyze how laws
and policies reflect attitudes about individuals who become involved in the
criminal justice system.11 For example, the legal and social status of people
with mental illness has been influenced by the law, social policy, and
societal norms.12 People with mental illnesses are often thought of as
having “incurable medical diseases that make them dangerous to society.” 13
Unfortunately, legal procedure and mechanisms have a direct affect on the
autonomy of people with mental illness.14 New scientific and technological
advances in treatment for mental illnesses have provided a means for courts
to help facilitate rehabilitation for offenders with mental illness.15 Because
a significant number of people with mental illness are involved in the
criminal justice system, it is of paramount importance that the legal system
reflects the new advances and incorporates the theoretical concepts of
therapeutic jurisprudence.16
B. PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS
Problem-solving courts are defined as specialized courtrooms “that are
working to ensure not just that the punishment fits the crime . . . but that the
process fits the problem.”17 Problem-solving courts not only address issues
of disputed fact, but also focus on underlying social or psychological
problems responsible for the dispute.18 Problem-solving courts seek to
connect defendants to therapeutic interventions including rehabilitative

9. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 49.
10. JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 8, at 7.
11. William Spaulding et al., Applications of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Rehabilitation
For People with Severe and Disabling Mental Illness, 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 135, 136 (2000).
12. Id. Some laws require a specific diagnosis of a mental illness when determining legal
competence, culpability for crimes, or eligibility for public services. Id. at 137; see 53 AM. JUR.
2D Mentally Impaired Persons § 10 (2006) (stating that a showing of mental illness is required for
civil commitments).
13. Spaulding et al., supra note 11, at 140.
14. See id. at 136 (indicating that laws that relate to public safety have been created to
directly address problems associated with mental illness).
15. Id. at 151-55. “Just as . . . judges dealing with patent cases need to understand basic
principles of engineering, judges performing in a problem-solving capacity . . . need to understand . . . the science of human behavior.” JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 8, at 7.
16. See Spaulding et al., supra note 11, at 170 (suggesting that the therapeutic jurisprudence
perspective can help provide more informed decision-making by using advancements in mental
health research for better outcomes for both society and the mentally-ill defendant).
17. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 5.
18. Winick, supra note 6, at 1055.
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drug treatment and mental health treatment.19 The focus of these courts
have a common underlying premise; courts should recognize and
understand the social or psychological problems behind a dispute and solve
these problems in a way that ensures that the offender will not return to
jail.20 Doing so will ensure that society is better protected.21 Drug courts,
domestic violence courts, unified family courts, and mental health courts
are all examples of problem-solving courts that have been created across
the United States.22
C. ORIGIN OF THE PROBLEM-SOLVING MOVEMENT
Before the creation of specialized problem-solving courts, judges and
lawyers faced enormous pressure to process cases quickly with little regard
for the defendants, communities, or victims involved.23 As caseloads began
to rise, traditional courts began to develop systems that sought to achieve

19. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 32; see Michael C. Dorf &
Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From Innovation to Institutionalization, 40 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1501, 1508 (2003) (explaining that a web of “reciprocal accountability” is created
between mental health providers, courts, and defendants that reach beyond the conventional
adversarial approach).
20. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 32.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 7-8; see Winick, supra note 6, at 1056 (discussing specialized courts established to
address specific issues). Drug courts are specialized courts created in response to the failure to
address addictive behavior problems when processing drug possession charges that are
nonviolent. Id. at 1056. As a result, the offenders often resume abusing drugs after release from
prison and end up back in court. Id. Drug courts emphasize the offender’s rehabilitation, and
defendants who agree to participate are monitored with mandatory drug testing. Id. at 1057; see
generally OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DRUG COURTS: THE SECOND
DECADE (2006), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/211081.pdf (explaining the
proliferation and success of drug courts across the United States). Domestic violence courts focus
on psychological problems associated with batterers and often require attendance in batterer
intervention programs, along with strict monitoring of court orders. BERMAN & FEINBLATT,
GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 7-8; see, e.g., Randal B. Fritzler & Leonore M.J. Simon, The
Development of a Specialized Domestic Violence Court in Vancouver, Washington Utilizing
Innovative Judicial Paradigms, 69 UMKC L. REV. 139, 139 (2000) (demonstrating the impact of
a domestic violence court as a catalyst for system reform). Unified family courts concentrate on
addressing the legal, emotional, and social problems associated with family law cases. Barbara A.
Babb & Judith D. Moran, Substance Abuse, Families, and Unified Family Courts: The Creation of
a Caring Justice System, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 1, 3-4 (1999); see also Susan L. Brooks
& Dorothy E. Roberts, Social Justice and Family Court Reform, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 453, 455
(2002) (noting that unified family courts address all of the family’s issues in one court and use
therapeutic jurisprudence to concentrate on the underlying problems occurring within the family).
23. Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, in JUDGING IN
A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 8, at 76; see BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note
7, at 17 (noting that many courts “lack a coherent logic” and few resources are used to address
issues such as mental illness and drug abuse which fuel increases in caseloads).
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tangible outcomes, such as reduced recidivism.24 Many judges became
frustrated with not having the ability to address the underlying problem
even when following appropriate procedures and making certain that the
litigant’s legal rights were protected.25 Former Minnesota Chief Justice,
Kathleen Blatz, summarized what judges experienced by noting, “You
know, I feel like I work for McJustice: we sure aren’t good for you, but we
are fast.”26
Traditional courts have not been able to adequately address the
underlying problems associated with mentally ill defendants stemming from
lack of intervention.27 The traditional court process has been described as
measuring performance by process rather than by outcomes.28 In many
cases, the conventional processing of a case resulting in short-term jail,
probation, and “sentences where the offender is basically told to stay out of
trouble,” fails to address how to prevent the criminal behavior from
occurring in the future.29 Increased recidivism has generated broad effects
that strain court resources, overcrowd jails, and result in ineffective
treatment.30 As a result, the problem-solving movement emerged by
borrowing strategies from other disciplines such as alternative dispute
resolution, therapeutic jurisprudence, and juvenile courts to deal with issues
surrounding criminals who are being recycled through the system.31 Within
the problem-solving model, courts focus on valuing emotional well-being
and human needs by using therapeutic jurisprudence as a theoretical
foundation.32 Judges and attorneys become problem-solvers rather than
24. Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, in JUDGING IN
THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 8, at 79. Recidivism refers to a tendency toward habitual,
repeated criminal activity. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1297 (8th ed. 2004).
25. See Winick, supra note 6, at 1060 (explaining that the traditional court model did not
address the underlying problem, and it re-emerged requiring further judicial intervention).
26. Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, in JUDGING IN
A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 8, at 77.
27. See Gregory L. Acquaviva, Comment, Mental Health Courts: No Longer Experimental,
36 SETON HALL L. REV. 971, 974 (2006) (noting that judges have become frustrated with the
“traditional handling of mentally ill offenders”). The adversarial approach may be effective for
some criminal cases, but not for other “minor” cases involving shoplifting or petty drug offenses.
BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 4.
28. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 27.
29. Id. at 17.
30. Acquaviva, supra note 27, at 975.
31. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 39.
32. See Cait Clarke & James Neuhard, “From Day One”: Who’s in Control as Problem
Solving and Client-Centered Sentencing Take Center Stage?, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
11, 14 (2004) (explaining that many defense lawyers who use a client-centered advocacy
approach are trying to address the underlying problems that brought the defendant into court in the
first place); see also James R. Walker, Getting the Mentally Ill Misdemeanant Out of Jail, 6
SCHOLAR 371, 392 (2004) (suggesting that a therapeutic justice approach can effectively deal with
“chronic, relapse-prone” disorders).
A
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simply “case processors,” and view their cases as more than just matters to
be adjudicated.33
Today, more than 2000 problem-solving courts exist in the United
States.34 All of these courts share special characteristics relating to the
structure and function of processing cases.35 Problem-solving courts are
defining success in innovative ways and are forced to think thoroughly
about outcomes of the court process, not only for the defendant, but also for
the community.36 With more involvement of judicial authority, judges stay
closely involved in problem-solving courts and promote compliance with
orders.37
Additionally, problem-solving courts recognize that rising caseloads
are part of a larger social problem within a community.38 For example,
drug addiction and mental illness are recognized as social problems that
contribute to the rising caseload.39 Problem-solving courts try to understand what is fueling the caseload and also the underlying problems that
brought the person to court in the first place.40 Furthermore, problemsolving courts bring new tools from a variety of disciplines such as government, non-profit organizations, and human service agencies to achieve their
goals.41 Moreover, existing legal actors take on new roles.42 Judges in
problem-solving courts seek to “resolve both the judicial case and the
problem that produced it.”43 The role of attorneys changes from an adversarial approach to a team approach when working with social workers and
other court members to implement a successful plan ensuring that the
problem is resolved and the defendant does not have a reoccurrence of the
criminal behavior.44

33. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 5.
34. Id. at 9 (“Every state has at least one.”).
35. Id. at 34-35.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 35.
38. Id. at 36.
39. See Winick, supra note 6, at 1060 (explaining that mental illness and drug addiction
problems often require “repeated judicial intervention”).
40. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 36.
41. Id. at 36-37. For example, connecting people to community resources, monitoring progress, and ensuring that needed services and treatment are provided are tools developed by other
agencies that problem-solving courts apply in the court process. Winick, supra note 6, at 1061.
42. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 37.
43. Winick, supra note 6, at 1061.
44. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 37.
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS
Mental health courts (MHCs) are problem-solving courts that use the
therapeutic jurisprudence model with collaboration from mental health care
professionals to provide mental health treatment to offenders in an attempt
to prevent repeated criminal activity.45 MHCs are created in an effort to
divert offenders with mental illness away from jail and prison.46 Moreover,
MHCs were created out of the problem-solving court model to address the
underlying problems fueled by caseloads involving mentally ill offenders.47
Also, the MHCs have been developed in response to the repeated occurrence of problem behavior that requires the court to intervene each time it
occurs.48 In order to examine how MHCs emerged on the American legal
landscape, it is necessary to explain how and why mentally ill offenders
have become a large segment of the criminal population in courts, jails, and
prisons across the country.49
A. IMPACT OF DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION
Beginning in the 1950s, the need for the institutionalization of the
mentally ill began to decrease as a result of more effective treatment
options, such as psychiatric medications.50 In the 1970s, civil commitment
statutes were being changed to make it more difficult to commit mentally ill
individuals into mental institutions.51 During the 1970s, legislators and
reformers wanted to change policies related to civil commitments to reflect
the least restrictive means possible to treat mentally ill patients.52 The
gradual shift of individuals from state-operated mental hospitals to

45. Acquaviva, supra note 27, at 985-86.
46. Id. at 985. Mental health courts were created in response to the overrepresentation of
individuals with mental illnesses involved in the criminal justice system. COUNCIL OF STATE
GOV’TS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, A GUIDE TO MENTAL HEALTH COURT DESIGN AND
IMPLEMENTATION 1 (2005), available at http://consensusproject.org/mhcp/Guide-MHC-Design
.pdf [hereinafter COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS]. In comparison to other responses to this problem,
the MHC approach involves a court docket that is only composed of defendants with mental
illnesses, and there is a team-based monitoring system. Id. at 2.
47. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 3-4.
48. Acquaviva, supra note 27, at 974-75. Traditional interventions have not addressed the
underlying problem resulting in a re-emergence of the problem “necessitating repeated judicial
intervention.” Id. at 975.
49. See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 2 (explaining that a variety of causes can be
linked to the “phenomenon” of the increasing number of mentally ill offenders in prison).
50. Id. at 2. Psychiatric medications created the option of treatment on an outpatient basis
for many severe mental disorders. Id. at 2. Medications, such as Chlorpromazine, reduced
deviant behaviors in patients and allowed them to be treated in the community rather than in an
institution. Walker, supra note 32, at 378.
51. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 2.
52. Id.
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community-based treatment is often referred to as “deinstitutionalization.”53
Deinstitutionalization impacted the number of individuals with mental
illness, who were forced out of hospitals and back into the community to
receive treatment, because many could be treated on an outpatient basis
rather than requiring institutionalization.54 However, many mentally ill
individuals returned to their communities only to find no resources or
community-based treatment services available.55
B. THE COURTS’ ROLE IN DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION
Over time, the courts have had an impact on the deinstitutionalization
process.56 Courts began to intervene and strike down statutes that
authorized involuntary hospitalization of those who were non-violent.57
For example, in Lessard v. Schmidt,58 a federal district court held that a
Wisconsin statute relating to civil commitment should be struck down on
the basis that it had no connection with the state’s goals in regard to the
criminal justice system.59 The plaintiff in Lessard had the right to
challenge the involuntary civil commitment order if it could be shown that
she was not a danger to society.60 The state’s interests were not furthered
by her commitment.61 Therefore, the court recognized that the civil
commitment procedures did not provide adequate due process.62
Additionally, in 1975, the United States Supreme Court held in
O’Connor v. Donaldson63 that a state cannot confine an individual who is
not a danger to his or her community and who is capable of surviving
without assistance.64 In O’Connor, the Supreme Court held that ordering a
civil commitment cannot be based on a showing of mental illness alone.65
If the mentally ill person is not a danger to society, the state cannot confine
53. Id.
54. See GOIN, supra note 4, at 2 (explaining that in 1955, the population of mental hospitals
was 559,000, and in 1999, it was approximately 80,000).
55. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 3; see GOIN, supra note 4, at 2 (suggesting that
the integration of people with mental illnesses back into the community was never adequately
funded).
56. See LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts
in the Provision of Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 255, 268-69
(2001) (explaining the impact of court intervention on deinstitutionalization).
57. Id. at 268.
58. 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
59. Lessard, 413 F. Supp. at 1320.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1319.
63. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
64. O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 576.
65. Id. at 575.
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the individual to a mental hospital.66 Many states began to amend their
statutes relating to civil commitment and individuals with mental illness left
the state mental health hospitals to receive community-based treatment. 67
However, community treatment options were not made available, leaving
many mentally ill people with no support services.68 The difficulty in providing access to treatment in the community was an “unintended consequence” of the shift resulting from the change in public policy.69 In what is
often referred to as a “mass exodus,” deinstitutionalization caused a
dramatic change in the way communities accommodate individuals with a
mental illness.70 Many communities were not prepared for the impact of
deinstitutionalization and are still trying to find resources to provide
services for mentally ill persons in the community.71
A recent case shows the Supreme Court’s recognition of the
importance of community based treatment in providing the least restrictive
means of treatment for mentally ill people who do not pose a threat to
society.72 The United States Supreme Court held in Olmstead v. L.C.73 that
states must provide community-based treatment when mental health
professionals determine that the patient can be better served in the
community, rather than in a state mental hospital.74 The Court based its
decision on provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
which impacted anti-discrimination policies relating to individuals with
disabilities in public services.75 Both the Olmstead decision and the ADA
have corrected discrimination experienced by individuals with mental

66. Id.
67. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 3.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Acquaviva, supra note 27, at 980; see Walker, supra note 32, at 378 (noting that the
“mass exodus” describes the dramatic shift of the mentally ill from institutions into the
community).
71. See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 3 (noting the lack of access to mental health
treatment in the community and indicating that “transinstitutionalization” is the term often used to
explain the rise of mentally ill offenders in prisons after deinstitutionalization from state mental
health facilities began).
72. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999) (holding that when mental health professionals determine a patient can be accommodated in the community, transfer from an institutional
setting to community-based treatment is appropriate).
73. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
74. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 607.
75. Id. at 592. “Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination
by any such entity.” Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006).
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illness.76 Even though court involvement created many improvements in
the well-being of individuals with mental illness, the lack of available
community-based treatment options left some individuals receiving no
treatment.77
C. THE REVOLVING DOOR
Often referred to as the “revolving door,” mentally ill offenders are
repeatedly recycled through the criminal justice system when they return to
jail without receiving appropriate treatment for their illness after living in
the community.78 In many cases, the “revolving door” process traps mentally ill offenders.79 The process often starts with offenders committing a
petty crime, such as urinating in public or shoplifting, and, in many situations, the petty crime leads to incarceration, followed by release, and ending
in prison for another offense.80 However, an offender’s mental condition
often deteriorates while in jail, and his or her mental decline contributes to
an already present mental illness.81 The problems surrounding offenders
trapped in the “revolving door” have forced the criminal justice system to
re-examine how to cope with offenders who have serious mental illness.82
D. ILL-EQUIPPED JAILS AND PRISONS
Jails and prisons are often ill-equipped to provide for the needs of
mentally ill offenders.83 Treating such offenders in a prison requires time,
which is why many inmates with mental illnesses serve longer sentences
than other prisoners who have committed the same crime.84 “Our jails,
76. See generally Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can
Sanist Attitudes be Undone?, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 15, 15 (1993-94) (explaining that the ADA is the
most far-reaching federal legislation relating to the discrimination of people with disabilities).
77. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 3.
78. Acquaviva, supra note 27, at 974-75.
79. Kondo, supra note 56, at 257.
80. Id. “In Florida, a mentally ill homeless man was arrested for shoplifting a $1.16 ice
cream sandwich. He was imprisoned because he lacked the $25 bail necessary for release.” Id. at
256. Twenty-five percent of state prisoners and jail inmates with mental illness have served an
average of three or more previous incarcerations. JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 1, at 1.
81. Acquaviva, supra note 27, at 979-80.
82. Id. at 977.
83. Richard A. Marini, Mental Health Courts Focus on Treatment; Criminals Often
Overlooked in Traditional System are Sentenced to Hospital Care, in JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC
KEY, supra note 8, at 60.
84. See JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 1, at 8 (indicating that state prisoners with mental
illnesses serve a reported five months longer than prisoners without mental illnesses); see also
PAULA DITTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. 147633, MENTAL HEALTH AND TREATMENT OF
INMATES AND PROBATIONERS 8 (1999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
mhtip.pdf (explaining that mentally ill prison inmates served more time than inmates without
mental illness).
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whether we like it or not, are becoming [the nation’s] largest mental-health
facilities.”85 According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, fifty percent of
prison inmates and thirty-four percent of jail inmates report receiving
medication to treat mental illness while incarcerated.86 In many respects,
the criminal justice system has become the mental health system for mentally ill offenders who populate jails and prisons.87 The fact that people
with mental illness are overrepresented in jails and prisons across the nation
indicates that the public mental health systems are not adequate or accessible to those in need of it.88
In addition, many jails and prisons find that they cannot provide the
adequate care necessary to treat seriously mentally ill inmates.89 In Estelle
v. Gamble,90 the United States Supreme Court held that when prisoners are
subjected to “deliberate indifference” by prison staff providing for the
medical needs of the inmate, there is a violation of the Eighth Amendment
which involves “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”91 The Court
noted that denying medical treatment to prison inmates causes pain and
suffering that does not serve a “penological purpose.”92
For example, in Coleman v. Wilson,93 the federal court for the Eastern
District of California held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution requires states to provide for the “basic human needs of prison
inmates.”94 This obligation includes access to appropriate mental health
care.95 The court noted that proving a violation of the right to appropriate
care depends on whether the deprivation is “sufficiently serious,” or
whether it is a serious medical need without which the inmate’s condition
would deteriorate.96 Also, there must be “deliberate indifference” by the

85. Kondo, supra note 56, at 257.
86. DITTON, supra note 84, at 9.
87. See GOIN, supra note 4, at 2 (“Our jails and prisons . . . have become the primary mental
health care facilities in the United States today”).
88. See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 3 (explaining that many people with mental
illness live in their communities with inadequate support services).
89. See Jeff Wellborn, Responding to Individuals with Mental Illness, FBI LAW
ENFORCEMENT BULL., Nov. 1999, at 6 (noting that law enforcement officers are trained to
enforce the law and not necessarily trained to interact with mentally ill persons).
90. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
91. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
92. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
93. 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
94. Coleman, 912 F. Supp. at 1297.
95. Id. at 1298 (citing Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994)).
96. Id.; see Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 578 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment was violated where the lack of mental health care involving a once-per-month visit to
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prison staff to provide care to the inmate.97 However, the court noted that
although the inmate might be receiving treatment for his or her mental
illness, it might not be adequate.98 Under those circumstances, an Eighth
Amendment claim would not be appropriate unless it was found to be
“deliberately indifferent.”99
In some cases, jail staff fail to provide adequate treatment necessary for
mentally ill inmates.100 For example, in 1998 the Seventh Circuit decided
Lawson v. Trowbridge,101 where an individual with schizophrenia was
placed in solitary confinement without receiving the medication he
needed.102 Between November 19, 1993, and March 3, 1994, Lawson did
not receive any medication for his mental illness.103 In a retrial, a jury
awarded Lawson four hundred thousand dollars in compensatory damages
and five million dollars in punitive damages.104 Lawson provides an
example of a situation involving an ill-equipped jail that was not able to
provide appropriate treatment for a severely mentally ill inmate.105
These cases demonstrate that jails and prisons were never intended to
be mental hospitals.106 Often, inmates leave prison in the same condition
they came in as, or worse, they leave prison with a deteriorating mental
condition that went untreated while incarcerated.107 Ill-equipped jails and
prisons have contributed to the revolving door process when mentally ill
offenders are released and are unable to access community-based treatment.108 Recognizing this problem, courts have developed innovative
approaches to address the complex problems that arise with mentally ill

the prison from a psychiatrist was found to be “ridiculously pathetic” and not reasonably
adequate).
97. Coleman, 912 F. Supp at 1298.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS 94 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1003/usa1003.pdf
(explaining that many prisons do not provide necessary mental health care to inmates).
101. 153 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 1998).
102. Lawson, 153 F.3d at 371-72.
103. Id.
104. JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, Federal Jury Awards
$5.4 million in Damages for Solitary Confinement of Prisoner with Schizophrenia, http://
www.bazelon.org/newsroom/archive/1999/3-10-99lawson.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2006).
105. See id. (stating that the Lawson case is important because it recognized the problem of
inadequate mental health treatment in jail).
106. See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 3 (stating that jails and prisons were not
intended to be psychiatric institutions).
107. Id. at 3-4.
108. Id. at 4; see, e.g., Alan Feuer, Out of Jail, Into Temptation: A Day in a Life, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2002, at A1 (providing insight into the life of a released drug offender and the
potential likelihood for re-offending).
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defendants who commit petty crimes and are recycled through the
system.109 One of these innovations is the development of MHCs.110
E.

THE PROLIFERATION OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS

Today, there are approximately 150 MHCs across the United States.111
The structure and process of MHCs requires collaboration between the
criminal justice and mental health systems in a community because both
systems often collide when people with mental illness end up in jail.112 The
collaboration of the mental health system and criminal justice system to
address the needs of the mentally ill offender is a necessary component to
the effectiveness of MHCs.113
MHCs have been defined as specialized dockets where participants
with mental illness voluntarily agree to a treatment program developed by a
team comprised of mental health providers and court personnel.114 MHCs
are based on the problem-solving court model, which involves focusing on
the underlying problem behind a defendant’s introduction to the criminal
justice system.115 Non-adherence to the treatment plan may be sanctioned,
while adherence may be rewarded.116 In some cases, incarceration may be
the appropriate option for mentally ill offenders who pose serious threats to
public safety.117 However, for those who do not pose threats to the public
nor have violent criminal records, incarceration may not make sense.118
Because of the alarming rate at which mentally ill offenders are entering the
criminal justice system, many states have developed MHCs in an effort to
address problems such as overcrowding, recidivism, and strained

109. JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 8, at 59.
110. Id.
111. E-mail from Nesa Wasarhaley, Research Assistant, Council of State Governments (June
22, 2007 16:19:30 CST) (on file with author); see NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR THE MENTALLY ILL,
SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS (2005) [hereinafter SURVEY] (indicating that as of
December 2005, there were more than 113 MHCs); see also COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS,
MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: A NATIONAL SNAPSHOT, http://www.consensusproject.org/mhcourts/
national-snapshot.pdf (indicating that as of June 2005, more than 125 MHCs were implemented in
the United States).
112. Munetz & Teller, supra note 3, at 935.
113. See id. at 937 (explaining that an important step to successful collaboration is the ability
of the mental health system and the criminal justice system to work together to find solutions).
114. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 2.
115. Id. at iv.
116. Id. at 2.
117. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 1.
118. See id. (noting that the significant costs and the lack of a therapeutic environment in the
prison setting are obvious drawbacks to incarcerating mentally ill offenders that do not have
violent criminal records).
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resources.119 Also, MHCs are utilized to provide adequate and appropriate
treatment, which some offenders might not have had access to otherwise.120
According to Judge Randal B. Fritzler, creating a MHC that can be
utilized as an instrument of risk management requires restructuring the
court process.121 Judge Fritzler provides ten key components that are
necessary in structuring MHCs.122 First, a specialized team must be created
to manage the cases involving offenders who are mentally ill.123 The team
should be comprised of attorneys, mental health workers, and the judge.124
Second, labeling and stigmatization should not be allowed inside the courtroom.125 It is important not to label defendants based on their medical
diagnoses.126 Third, sentencing processes should involve an incentive, such
as avoiding conviction.127 Fourth, the least restrictive means should be
used to get clients into supportive programs.128 The means by which this is
done should always take into account public safety.129 Fifth, the court
should encourage the welfare of the defendant by promoting the
enhancement of basic treatment options available.130 Next, the sixth
component provides that the court should support autonomous decisionmaking relating to the defendant’s mental health issues with suggestions
from the mental health team.131 Also, the seventh component notes that the
technical rules of the courtroom should not apply in the MHC
environment.132 This prohibition creates more meaningful participation
among legal actors in the courtroom, as opposed to an adversarial
approach.133 The eighth component in structuring a MHC is the drafting of
119. Id. at 7.
120. Ronda Cress et al., Mental Health Courts and Title II of the ADA: Accessibility to State
Court Systems for Individuals with Mental Disabilities and the Need for Diversion, 25 ST. LOUIS
U. PUB. L. REV. 307, 332-33 (2006).
121. Judge Randall B. Fritzler, 10 Key Components of a Criminal Mental Health Court, in
JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 8, at 118.
122. Id. at 118-21.
123. Id. at 118.
124. Id.; see COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 63 (noting that the mental health
court team typically is comprised of a judicial officer and treatment provider, or case manager,
who provide direct services to defendants).
125. Judge Randall B. Fritzler, 10 Key Components of a Criminal Mental Health Court, in
JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 8, at 119.
126. See id. (noting that labels cause unnecessary stigmatization and feelings of
powerlessness).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 120.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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a manual that includes the client’s rights and the specific procedures that
will be adopted by the court.134 Ninth, the opportunity to intervene and get
treatment for the client should be utilized as soon as the client is arrested.135
The time soon after the participant is arrested is when the defendant might
be more receptive to receiving the help that he or she needs.136 Finally, a
dedicated court team that has a meaningful review process concerning the
needs of the client is required in order to structure the MHC in a way that
effectively addresses the underlying problem.137 The court team must
consistently reassess the participant’s response to treatment in order to
provide risk management.138 The ten components are important because
they establish how the MHC should be structured to provide the benefits of
a problem-solving court approach.139
Also, along with the restructuring of the court process, the MHC
approach expands the traditional roles of the judge and attorneys.140 As the
structure and process of the court changes, the defense attorney, prosecutor,
and judge play important roles in providing a meaningful review process of
the mentally ill defendant in a MHC.141 The next section will examine how
the roles of defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges are expanded in
MHCs.
IV. STAKEHOLDERS IN THE MENTAL HEALTH COURT: A
NONTRADITIONAL ROLE
The development of problem-solving courts, such as MHCs, requires
collaboration with policy-makers and mental health providers to address
gaps in the system.142 Interaction between public health agencies in the
community, mental health advocates, and the court system is necessary to
ensure that mental health care is accessible and affordable for offenders
with mental illness.143 For these reasons, the legal actors take on new roles

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 121.
Id.
Id. at 118.
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 63.
Id.
Id. at 61-62; see THE PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMM’N ON MENTAL HEALTH,
ACHIEVING THE PROMISE: TRANSFORMING MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 1 (2003), available at http://www.mentalhealthcommission.gov/reports/FinalReport/downloads/ExecSummary
.pdf (noting the fragmented mental health system is a substantial obstacle for getting effective
treatment).
143. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 62.
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in MHCs.144 The development of the courtroom team expands the
traditional professional roles of attorneys and judges by shifting away from
an adversarial approach.145 Instead, defense attorneys may find themselves
trying to extend supervision when necessary.146 Prosecutors may find
themselves working for the best interest of the defendant, and judges may
find themselves acting more like probation officers or social workers, rather
than “impartial arbiters of fact.”147
A. DEFENSE ATTORNEYS
The unique role of the defense attorney within the MHC model
continues to encompass the traditional role of advocating for the best
interests of the client.148 However, the role of translator and representative
becomes even more important for clients with serious mental illnesses.149
Because budget cuts in social services and deinstitutionalization fuel large
workloads, defenders are finding it necessary to re-examine effective
strategies for their clients with serious mental illness.150 Further, where
appropriate alternatives are available, defense attorneys can help the client
find meaningful, effective treatment.151
On the other hand, many defense attorneys have paid little attention to
alternatives, innovative diversions, and negotiations for their criminal
clients.152 Examples of these alternatives include community education
alternatives, training programs, and treatment programs.153 Other stakeholders in the criminal justice system view defense attorneys as being too
focused on the client instead of on treatment programs and community
safety.154 Moreover, some defenders avoid the problem-solving model

144. JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 8, at 5.
145. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 63.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. CONSENSUS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 75. Counsel should be appointed as soon as
possible when a person enters the system because there are “critical stages” that occur prior to
trial. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 77-78 (3d ed.
1992).
149. CONSENSUS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 74.
150. Clarke & Neuhard, supra note 32, at 18-19.
151. CONSENSUS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 74. “[A]ttorneys have a responsibility to know
about the mental health resources in the community—both their quality and their availability—
that might be appropriate for clients with mental health issues . . . .” Id. Also, pretrial services
agencies or programs can identify individuals who might need special treatment before trial.
NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERVICES, NAPSA RELEASE STANDARDS AND COMMENTARY 55
(2004), available at http://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/ corrections/pretrial/napsaStandards2004.pdf.
152. Clarke & Neuhard, supra note 32, at 13-14.
153. Id. at 22.
154. Id. at 13-14.
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because they fear that it compromises their ethical conduct in advocating
zealously for their client.155 As traditional roles change, new ethical questions arise.156 However, it has always been the role of defense attorneys to
protect fairness in the system and the dignity of an accused client in the
process.157 Defense attorneys should embrace the development of alternatives such as MHCs in providing effective services for clients.158
When a case is heard using the problem-solving court model, the
defense attorney focuses on the sentencing and treatment stages, rather than
on the culpability stage.159 “Winning” a case has a new meaning within the
problem-solving court model.160 “Winning means preserving human dignity and helping clients become productive and peaceful members of a
community.”161 As defenders become part of the solution, effective advocacy provides better outcomes for the client and community.162
When defense attorneys look to alternative approaches for mentally ill
clients, they should look for opportunities that will meet the needs of the
mentally ill client and opportunities that will serve justice at the same
time.163 One of the first steps for defense attorneys is to identify those
clients who have mental illnesses.164 By identifying a client who has a
serious mental illness, the defense attorney can ensure the identification of
appropriate alternatives.165 Also, the defender can help clients’ families
navigate the criminal justice system to ensure successful outcomes.166
Although some defense attorneys are uncomfortable with this nontraditional approach, advocating for the best possible choice for the client

155. Id.
156. Id. at 14.
157. Id. at 19.
158. See id. at 19 (explaining that defense counsel should take the initiative “to stake out the
parameters of their ethical duties” as responsibilities shift beyond sentencing).
159. Id. at 23.
160. Id. at 22-23.
161. Id. at 23.
162. Id. at 21-22. New models of defense lawyering offer the chance for defenders to be
“part of the solution, improving the community as a whole.” Id. at 22. When defense attorneys
help clients get into programs, such as specialty courts, the potential for repeating the offense is
reduced resulting in a better outcome for the community. Id. Also, helping the client get
treatment for drug abuse or find employment is an important objective in defining the meaning of
“winning” in a problem-solving court. Id. at 23.
163. CONSENSUS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 72.
164. Id. at 74.
165. Id. at 75.
166. Id. at 76. For example, the Urban Justice Center provides families with a handbook
detailing the criminal justice process and advice for working with defense attorneys. Id.
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and contesting the merits of the case are still encompassed within the
problem-solving approach.167
B. PROSECUTORS
In concurrence with the nontraditional role that defense counsel
assumes in the MHC model, prosecutors’ roles also expand when maximizing the use of alternatives through pretrial diversion.168 While changes
occur within this role, there are also important traditional goals that must be
retained by the prosecutor.169 Preserving the best interests of justice remains an important consideration.170 Within the traditional framework of
judicial process, offering a defendant the opportunity to participate in a
MHC program can also serve the best interests of justice.171
When confronted with an offender with a mental illness, the prosecutor’s chief concern is public safety.172 Because prosecutors often view
mentally ill offenders as being recycled through the criminal justice system,
many prosecutors are now considering alternatives with the hope of
reducing recidivism.173 By focusing on risk assessment and case targeting
alternatives, such as MHCs, prosecutors remain committed to general
societal welfare.174
In traditional cases, prosecutors rely on criteria such as an offender’s
criminal record, danger to society, the nature of the offense, and the wishes
of the victim in deciding whether the individual should be offered an
alternative to the traditional criminal proceedings.175 When the offender is
mentally ill, a prosecutor should also consider whether the individual was
receiving treatment in the community for a mental condition.176 Also,
prosecutors should consider the relationship between the mental illness and
the behavior that resulted in arrest.177 This approach is different from the

167. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 116-17.
168. CONSENSUS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 82.
169. Id. at 82 n.7.
170. Id. “The prosecutor plays an important role in the diversion process—he initiates the
movement into diversion, and he must judge the efficaciousness of diversionary treatment.”
NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS, No. 11.8 cmt. at 154 (Nat’l Dist. Att’ys Ass’n 1977). The
prosecutor must keep “the rights of society in a paramount position.” Id. at 9.
171. See CONSENSUS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 82 (explaining that the “best interests of
justice” can be served by addressing the underlying problem that led to an offense).
172. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 19.
173. Id. at 20.
174. See id. (explaining that case targeting focused on defining eligibility for those who do
not pose a serious threat of violence is crucial to the prosecutor’s priorities).
175. CONSENSUS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 82.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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traditional judicial practice because it involves considering what would be
the best outcome for the defendant.178
Furthermore, in the nontraditional approach, the collaboration between
the defense and prosecution continues past the planning stage and into the
implementation of the treatment program.179 The prosecutor, along with
the defense counsel should encourage the offender to succeed in the program.180 In order to maintain effective collaboration, prosecutors in the
MHC should respond to probation violations with adjustments to treatment
programs, rather than imposing punishment.181
C. THE JUDGE
By applying a collaborative approach in the problem-solving framework, the judge takes on a leading role.182 The judge provides motivation,
inspiration, and direction to decide how the legal actors in the courtroom
will play their parts.183 The collaborative philosophy puts the judge’s focus
on “solving problems” and not just “deciding cases.”184 In the context of
problem-solving courts, such as MHCs, the judge’s role is more proactive,
and the judge explores a larger range of solutions.185 Judges in problemsolving courts often “think outside the box” to create better alternatives that
solve the underlying problem.186
Generally, the role of the judge in a conventional court involves the
judge in an authoritative, formal position, looking primarily at prior precedent and focusing on past behavior or conduct.187 However, in problemsolving courts, the judge acts as a coach providing effective collaboration to
provide a common sense plan for the defendant to stay out of jail.188 This
nontraditional approach is more “people-oriented” rather than “claim or

178. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 63.
179. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 37.
180. See id. at 37 (indicating that attorneys work together in implementing a treatment plan
to encourage success in the program).
181. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 63.
182. See JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 8, at 5 (suggesting that judges take a
lead role in coordinating what happens in a problem-solving court).
183. Id.
184. Donald J. Farole Jr. et al., Applying Problem-Solving Principles in Mainstream Courts:
Lessons for State Courts, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 57, 68 (2005).
185. See id. at 62-63 (indicating that judges determined that the problem-solving role allows
them to provide individualized court orders which is helpful in negotiation situations).
186. Id. at 63.
187. JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 8, at 6 (citing Judge Roger K. Warren).
“Tradition dictates that judges serve as neutral arbiters and that their work focus on process and
penalties.” BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 105.
188. JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 8, at 6 (citing Judge Roger K. Warren).
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case-oriented.”189 Moreover, the judge’s interaction with a defendant does
not end when a final decision has been reached.190 Instead, defendants are
required to report back to judges regarding their progress.191 Often, judges
learn about the defendant’s personal problems and family life.192 For
example, a judge in Los Angeles County explained that he encourages
defendants to speak about their treatment needs and side effects from
medications, and the judge orders regular progress reports from physicians.193 This direct interaction between the defendant and judge can motivate offenders to make progress.194 In this role, judges “[treat] defendants
with respect, [show] compassion, hav[e] faith in their ability to improve,
and [see] them as potential law-abiding citizens.”195
Skeptics suggest that judges using this new approach focus on
rehabilitation instead of individual responsibility.196 However, the requirements of treatment plans in problem-solving courts make it necessary for
defendants to do more in regard to hours of treatment, attendance in court
sessions, and responsibility than is required in other conventional courts.197
The judge remains the final link in a chain of supervision composed of the
mental health and criminal justice staff.198
Another problem that judges face with MHCs is limited time and
resources.199 The lack of time and money for these types of courts and the
pressure to “move cases along” has been noted as one of the most
significant barriers to the judicial role.200 Furthermore, judges often have to
deal with attorneys who are not familiar with the problem-solving approach
adopted by MHCs.201
The collaborative philosophy of the MHC model requires the legal
actors to take on new roles.202 Defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges
must collaborate with the mental health and criminal justice communities to

189. Id.
190. Id.
191. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 109.
192. Id.
193. Kondo, supra note 56, at 291.
194. Farole et al., supra note 184, at 63.
195. Id.
196. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 98.
197. Id. at 108.
198. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 67.
199. Farole et al., supra note 184, at 66-67.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 115 (acknowledging that
in the problem-solving court model, judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys collaborate as a
team).
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provide effective advocacy.203 Along with traditional goals, such as
providing the best interests of justice and protection of public safety, the
nontraditional goals, such as providing effective treatment, should also be
considered when advocating for the best outcome for mentally ill offenders
in the problem-solving court environment.204
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS
The application of therapeutic jurisprudence in the courtroom led to the
development of MHCs across the United States.205 MHCs have implemented a non-adversarial approach with the judge eliciting collaboration
from the mental health team.206 All states that have implemented MHCs
share the common goal of diverting mentally ill offenders away from “the
criminal process to the treatment in the community that they need.”207 This
section will provide examples of MHCs that have been created in Florida
and Minnesota and explain the response of Congress in relation to the
positive outcomes of MHCs.208 Further, the controversy surrounding the
implementation of MHCs will be examined through perspectives of both
proponents and critics of MHCs.209
A. BROWARD COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH COURT
In 1997, the first MHC was created in Broward County, Florida.210
Judge Ginger Lerner-Wren explained that the court was created “out of
desperation.”211 This desperation was the result of too many mentally ill
offenders being recycled through the criminal justice system.212 The MHC

203. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 52 (understanding basic information
about mental illness is necessary for court practitioners in a MHC).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 5.
206. Kondo, supra note 56, at 291.
207. JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 8, at 59.
208. See SURVEY, supra note 111, at 14, 25 (providing descriptions of the Broward and
Hennepin County MHCs).
209. See Susan Stefan & Bruce J. Winick, A Dialogue on Mental Health Courts, 11
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 507, 507-08 (2005) (noting the arguments of those who support and
oppose the implementation of MHCs).
210. Acquaviva, supra note 27, at 983; see JUDGE GINGER LERNER-WREN, NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE CTS., BROWARD’S MENTAL HEALTH COURT: AN INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO THE
MENTALLY DISABLED IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (2000), available at http://
www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KIS_ProSol_Trends99-00_FlaMentalPub.pdf. “The mission of the Mental Health Court is to better address the unique and complex needs of the mentally
disabled misdemeanant defendant arrested for nonviolent offenses.” Id.
211. Acquaviva, supra note 27, at 984-85.
212. See id. (stating that Broward County received a report concerning the “severe
shortfalls” in the mental health system).
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in Broward County operated under the therapeutic jurisprudential framework, where the court acted as more than an adjudicator by taking an active
role in finding effective treatment for offenders with mental illness.213
An example of a typical case coming before the Broward County MHC
involves a person who is charged with loitering in front of a convenience
store.214 When brought to court, the person is often visibly agitated and
fighting off the escorts who brought the person into the room.215 To a
conventional court, this behavior might appear to threaten public safety.216
However, after considering the defendant’s past record and mental
condition, Judge Lerner-Wren may conclude that the person’s conduct was
a result of mental illness, and not the result of having a “criminal mind.”217
To be eligible to participate in the MHC in Broward County, the
offender must have an Axis I serious mental illness, brain impairment, or
developmental disability.218 Candidates for the court are typically identified by jail staff who are involved with the intake of the offender.219 Also,
offenses that qualify for the MHC include all misdemeanors except
domestic violence and DUI.220 If the eligibility requirements are met, the
alternative that offenders are offered in Broward County is a supervised
treatment plan for one year while charges are temporarily set aside.221 In
serious cases, a guilty plea may be required with credit for time served.222
If a defendant does not adhere to the treatment plan, the sanctions include
incarceration, change in treatment, and a hearing before the judge.223 An
evaluation of the Broward MHC found that most participants appearing
before the court perceived that it provided an “opportunity to have their

213. Kondo, supra note 56, at 287.
214. Id. at 286.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 287.
218. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 28 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM IV] (indicating that Axis I disorders
include severe depression and anxiety disorders); SURVEY, supra note 111, at 14 (explaining the
criteria for eligibility in the Broward County MHC).
219. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 8.
220. SURVEY, supra note 111, at 14. If the charge is battery, the victim’s consent is required
for the case to be transferred to the MHC. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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voice[s] heard.”224 Moreover, the participants indicated that they did not
perceive the experience to be coercive.225
B. HENNEPIN COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH COURT
After the Broward County MHC opened the door to a new court
model, many counties began to plan and implement MHCs.226 In 2003,
Hennepin County, Minnesota, established a MHC.227 The Hennepin
County MHC has approximately 100 participants per year and is funded by
the Bureau of Justice Assistance along with funding from the county.228
The court team is composed of a mental health screener from the county
human services agency, a probation officer, a judge, and two attorneys.229
For offenders to be considered for participation in the MHC, a mental
health screener will make an initial decision on eligibility.230 Participants
must have either an Axis I231 or Axis II232 mental illness and the offense
must be a non-violent felony or misdemeanor.233 The program also accepts
offenders who have a co-occurring substance abuse problem.234 The final
decision on eligibility for the MHC remains with the judge, defense
attorney, and prosecutor.235 In order to qualify, the judge will require a
guilty plea, and the offender will be placed on probation.236 If a participant
successfully completes the program, the case can be dismissed or the charge

224. Louis de la Parte Fla. Mental Health Inst., Univ. of S. Fla., The Effectiveness of the
Broward Mental Health Court: An Evaluation, POLICY BRIEF, Nov. 2002 at 2, available at
http://www.fmhi.usf.edu/institute/pubs/newsletters/policybriefs/issue016.pdf.
225. Id. Results from an evaluation of the Broward County MHC indicated that:
The issue of coercion and its use permeates mental health law and policy, particularly
though not exclusively with the on-going debate over civil commitment laws.
Whether individuals perceive a particular intervention as coercive is important in
assessing how coercive a particular intervention might be. The mental health court is
perceived by those enrolled in the study as very non-coercive.
Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).
226. See generally SURVEY, supra note 111, at intro (indicating that in 2005, there were
approximately 113 MHCs across the United States).
227. Id. at 26.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. DSM IV, supra note 218, at 27-28. Axis I mental illnesses include major mental
disorders, learning disabilities, and developmental disabilities. Id. at 28. Some examples of Axis
I mental disorders include anxiety disorders, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia. Id.
232. Id. at 28-29. Axis II mental illnesses include pervasive personality conditions and
mental retardation. Id. at 29. Some examples of Axis II mental disorders include borderline
personality disorder, antisocial personality disorder, and narcissistic personality disorder. Id.
233. SURVEY, supra note 111, at 26.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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and sentence may be reduced.237 If the participant does not successfully
complete the program, the case is returned to the conventional criminal
court to be processed as a traditional criminal case.238
The implementation of MHCs has resulted in positive reports of
placing non-violent mentally ill offenders in judicially monitored treatment
programs.239 With the positive results from successful MHCs, Congress
recognized the need for better alternatives for mentally ill offenders.240 As
a result of the implementation of MHCs, funding to create more innovative
alternatives to incarceration for mentally ill offenders was initiated by the
United States Congress.241
C. FEDERAL LEGISLATION
As a result of the increased awareness of alternatives to incarceration
for mentally ill offenders, Congress enacted the Mentally Ill Offender
Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004.242 The purpose of the Act
was to increase collaboration between the criminal justice system and the
mental health system in order to facilitate public safety and provide
treatment options for mentally ill offenders.243 Another purpose of the Act
was to increase communication between professionals and elected officials
about the problems surrounding mentally ill offenders.244
Prior to the Act, Congress authorized monetary grants to states, state
courts, local courts, units of local government, and Indian tribal governments for the development of MHCs.245 The Mentally Ill Offender
Treatment and Crime Reduction Act (MIOTCRA) funded the Justice and
Mental Health Collaboration Program, which is administered by the Bureau
of Justice Assistance (BJA).246 In response to the overwhelming number of
offenders with mental illnesses, Congress further examined how resources
can be used more effectively to deal with the population of offenders.247
Congressman Ted Strickland stated that “[i]nmates, families, correctional
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See America’s Law Enforcement and Mental Health Project, Pub. L. No. 106-515
§ 2(5), 114 Stat. 2399, 2399 (2000) (finding positive results from the implementation of MHCs).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. 42 U.S.C. § 3797aa (2006).
243. 150 CONG. REC. S11261 (Oct. 11, 2004).
244. Id.
245. 42 U.S.C. § 3796ii (2006).
246. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, MENTAL HEALTH COURTS PROGRAM,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/mentalhealth.html (last visited June 18, 2007).
247. See id. (indicating that the MHC program seeks to implement and mobilize
communities to find effective treatment for offenders with mental disabilities).
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officers, judges, prosecutors and police are in unique agreement that our
broken system of punting the most seriously mentally ill to the criminal
justice system must be fixed.”248
Funding from the Act can be used to develop MHCs or other programs
providing alternatives to jail that meet requirements established by the
United States Attorney General.249 Testimony given in support of the Act
provided evidence of the concern that both mental health providers and
criminal justice officials are confronted with an overwhelming number of
mentally ill offenders entering prisons, jails, and courtrooms across the
country.250 Congress did not mandate a “one size fits all” approach.251 The
MIOTCRA permits communities to find appropriate alternatives that
provide better mental health treatment, whether via MHCs, or other
programs within the community, such as training for personnel in the
system or other court-based programs.252
The MIOTCRA of 2004, and America’s Law Enforcement and Mental
Health Project, fund the Mental Health Courts Program conducted by the
BJA.253 Reducing the amount of contact that mentally ill offenders have
with the criminal justice system is a focus of the grant program provided by
the BJA.254 The grant program provides funds to programs that connect
clients with housing, treatment, employment, and adequate support services.255 Also, the program supports projects that emphasize judicial
supervision that continues while the individual is in the program.256 In
addition, projects that stress intensive collaboration between mental health
providers, case managers, and criminal justice personnel are necessary to
receive grants from the BJA.257 Qualified offenders for the programs
248. Impact of Mentally Ill Offenders on the Criminal Justice System: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 21 (Sept. 21, 2000)
(statement of Rep. Ted Strickland).
249. 42 U.S.C. § 3797aa (b)(5)(I)(i).
250. See, e.g., Reauthorization of the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration: Hearing on S. 1194 Before the Subcomm. on Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services of the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 108th Cong. 41 (2003)
(statement of Gloria Walker, National Alliance for the Mentally Ill ) (explaining that people with
mental illness are “over-represented . . . in local jails and prisons.”); see also Fiscal 2005
Appropriations: Hearing on S. 1194 Before the Comm. on Appropriations and Subcomm. on
Labor, HHS, and Education (2004) (statement of Dr. Marcia Kraft Goin, President of the
American Psychiatric Association) (explaining the problem of the alarming rate at which
individuals with mental illness are entering the criminal justice system).
251. 150 CONG. REC. S11263 (Oct. 11, 2004) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
252. Id.
253. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 246.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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funded by the BJA include those charged with misdemeanors and non-violent offenses.258 Also, voluntary treatment in the “least restrictive manner,”
and the reduction in the number of sentences or types of charges are necessary components when establishing a MHC with funding from the BJA.259
D. CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE MHC MODEL
The implementation of MHCs has provoked controversy and new
questions relating to the effectiveness of the MHC approach.260 The civil
rights implications and the criminalization of those with mental illnesses are
additional issues in which both proponents and critics demand responses.261
Also, since mental illness is at issue, critics and proponents of MHCs have
different perspectives relating to how participants in a MHC understand the
consequences of the decision to participate in the MHC program.262
Finally, controversy surrounds the due process concerns relating to the
ordered treatment and its appropriateness to the defendant’s illness.263 The
responses that proponents and critics of MHCs have about the appropriateness of this new approach provide insight into the controversy surrounding
this evolving area of the law.264
1.

Proponents’ Arguments

Proponents of MHCs argue that processing individuals with mental
illness through a specialized court is a more appropriate way to provide the
services mentally ill offenders need than processing these offenders through
the conventional court system.265 Moreover, proponents claim that the
MHC is a pragmatic solution to dealing with social and medical problems
underlying cases that involve mentally ill offenders.266 Also, proponents
assert that providing a broad range of continuing treatment options can act

258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See generally Stefan & Winick, supra note 209, at 507-08 (noting that controversies
have been provoked by the inception of the MHC model relating to the effectiveness and value of
this new approach).
261. See id. at 508-11 (indicating that critics of MHCs view them as coercive and violative
of due process, whereas proponents view MHCs as “pragmatic solution[s]” for getting treatment
to those who are in need of it and preventing them from going to jail).
262. See id. (discussing different viewpoints concerning MHCs).
263. Amy Watson et al., Mental Health Courts and the Complex Issue of Mentally Ill
Offenders, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 477, 480-81 (2001).
264. See Stefan & Winick, supra note 209, at 507-08 (discussing the value and implications
of MHCs from the perspective of both proponents and critics).
265. Id. at 511.
266. Id. at 510.
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as a diversion to further criminal behavior.267 Proponents offer statistics
indicating a reduction in recidivism as evidence of the effectiveness of this
model.268 For example, the Broward County MHC indicated that only
twenty-seven percent of participants were rearrested, which suggested
significant improvement relating to “revolving door” issues.269
Further, proponents contend that the offense is often a result of the
mental illness, rather than of criminality.270 Proponents maintain that many
offenders with mental illness do not belong in the criminal justice system.271 Those who support MHCs assert that MHCs are not discriminating
in the adjudication of charges brought against mentally ill offenders.272
Proponents contend that the MHCs were developed to provide a separate
option for those eligible for a MHC program.273 In response to questions
relating to due process rights of the defendant in a MHC, proponents point
to the legal requirement that deciding to participate in a MHC must be
voluntary, and the decision must not involve coercive efforts to get the
defendant into treatment.274
Moreover, proponents of MHCs suggest that this approach is an
effective method of diverting individuals with mental illness away from
jails and prisons.275 Proponents assert that MHCs are not established to
discriminate against those mentally ill offenders who come and go through
267. See PAMELA M. CASEY & DAVID B. ROTTMAN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS.,
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: MODELS AND TRENDS 9 (2003), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/COMM_ProSolProbSolvCtsPub.pdf (explaining that participants receive more treatment in problem-solving courts, and criminal activity decreases once
enrolled).
268. See Acquaviva, supra note 27, at 991 (explaining the reduction in the rate of recidivism
for participants, such as a seventy-five percent decrease for successful participants in King
County, Washington).
269. Id. at 990-91.
270. See Jaime Levy Pessin, Stopping the Revolving Door: New Court Seeks New Ways to
Provide Justice to the Mentally Ill, CHI. LAW., Mar. 2005, at 8 (noting a Cook County Judge’s
opinion that some people are in jail because of mental illness rather than criminality); see also
Ellen Hochstedler Steury, Specifying ‘Criminalization’ of the Mentally Disordered Misdemeanant,
82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 334, 345 (1991) (indicating that in a study composed of
misdemeanants, the group with psychiatric problems had more extensive criminal records than the
group that did not have psychiatric problems).
271. Stefan & Winick, supra note 209, at 514.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 516. In a successful MHC, “[i]f the judge and defense attorney play their roles
appropriately . . . the defendant will be given an informed and voluntary choice concerning
whether to participate or to opt for routine criminal court processing.” Id. at 519-20; see Tammy
Seltzer, A Misguided Attempt to Address the Criminal Justice System’s Unfair Treatment of
People with Mental Illness, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 570, 574 (2005) (explaining that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause under the U.S. Constitution, and the Sixth
Amendment’s right to trial by jury, require that the option be voluntary).
275. Stefan & Winick, supra note 209, 514.
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the criminal justice system.276 As one advocate explained, “[t]he criminal
justice system is not singling out people with mental illness and arresting
them for conduct that others would not be arrested for.”277 If a defendant
wants to have his or her case processed through the traditional criminal
court process, he or she may do so.278 Additionally, supporters of MHCs
contend that defense counsel provide a meaningful presence when deciding
solutions to due process concerns by making sure that the options offered to
the defendant are reasonable.279 This advocacy typically occurs as part of
the planning process.280
2.

Opponents’ Arguments

Despite the argument that MHCs are an effective alternative because
they reduce recidivism in the population of mentally ill offenders, opponents argue that MHCs simply create more problems and divert resources
from more effective solutions.281 According to Susan Stefan, a public
interest attorney specializing in disability law, “[t]he creation of mental
health courts to solve the problems represented by people with psychiatric
disabilities in the criminal justice system is similar to an unhappy teenager
deciding to have a child to solve her problems.”282 Opponents of MHCs,
such as Stefan, assert that MHCs are just a way to provide individuals an
opportunity to avoid facing their problems.283 Similarly, those challenging
the effectiveness of MHCs contend that treatment plans do nothing more
than offer medication and do not offer support in other areas such as finding
housing or employment, which is a significant component in reducing
recidivism among mentally ill offenders.284
Furthermore, opponents of MHCs maintain that the criminal justice
system is not the appropriate way to provide access to mental health care.285
Also, because MHCs are a recent development and continually evolving,
opponents point out that there are no set standards to establish a definition
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 176-77.
280. Id. at 177. When problem-solving courts are implemented correctly, the courts can
improve the quality and value of sentencing while maintaining fairness in case processing. Id. at
188.
281. Stefan & Winick, supra note 209, at 510-11 (indicating that making mental health care
more accessible and providing better social services are more effective than specialized courts,
such as MHCs).
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Seltzer, supra note 274, at 583.
285. Id.
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of a MHC.286 The policy considerations surrounding MHCs raise questions
on whether there actually has been an increase in access to mental health
care for offenders with mental illness.287 Opponents assert that MHCs
provide a way to move “a particular group of people to the head of the line”
leaving others in need of services at the end of the line.288
Moreover, those opposed to the establishment of MHCs are critical of
the procedural concerns presented.289 Critics suggest that with the proliferation of these courts “a number of procedures [must be put] in place to
ensure a fairer balance between defendants’ constitutional rights to trial and
legal counsel and the protection of public safety and public health.”290
Opponents question whether mentally ill offenders are competent to make a
voluntary choice.291
Furthermore, the nontraditional role of the defense attorney in the
MHC model has been viewed as controversial.292 Critics of MHCs assert
that attorneys take on a passive role and forget their responsibilities to
advocate for their clients.293 These procedural differences have given rise
to questions relating to whether the constitutional rights of participants in
the MHC are violated.294 As a Minnesota public defender noted, “I’m concerned about the impact of telling the judge, the prosecutor and the
defender that they are all in this little boat together and they have to get
along out there on the ocean[.]”295
Critics argue that MHCs segregate people based on psychiatric
disability.296 In analyzing the use of sanctions in MHCs, opponents find it
difficult to accept the use of incarceration as punishment for noncompliance
of a treatment plan.297 Criminalization of individuals with mental illness is

286. Henry J. Steadman et al., Mental Health Courts: Their Promise and Unanswered
Questions, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 457, 458 (2001).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Seltzer, supra note 274, at 573-75.
290. Id. at 574.
291. Id.
292. See id. at 575 (suggesting that mentally ill offenders need strong advocacy by defense
counsel to guide them through the process).
293. Id.; see BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 180 (explaining that
critics question the “culture of team collaboration . . . [as] hav[ing] an insidious effect on
attorneys’ ability to engage in zealous advocacy”).
294. See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 19 (explaining that some defenders see a
potential due process violation when treatment is mandated). Critics also point out that when a
judge has control over the type of treatment that a person receives, separation of power may be
violated. Stefan & Winick, supra note 209, at 513.
295. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 180.
296. Stefan & Winick, supra note 209, at 512.
297. Seltzer, supra note 274, at 579.
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a concern to critics who note that MHCs are more punitive in nature rather
than serving as an alternative to incarceration.298 Some critics have suggested that individuals with mental illnesses are arrested and detained when
other individuals without mental illnesses would not normally be arrested
for the same crime.299 Finally, opponents argue that if the court supervision
over the treatment plan exceeds what would be given during a conventional
court process, this results in “discriminatory inequities.”300
The controversy surrounding the MHC model has brought a range of
questions for which both proponents and opponents believe they have
answers.301 Despite the contrasting views, both critics and supporters acknowledge the need to provide alternatives so that individuals with mental
illness are not recycled through the criminal justice system or warehoused
in prisons.302 Moreover, both proponents and critics recognize that individuals with mental illnesses are often disconnected from mental health
support systems and encounter the criminal justice system at an increasing
rate.303
VI. IMPACT ON NORTH DAKOTA
In many respects, North Dakota is confronting issues surrounding
mentally ill offenders in communities across the state and those located in
the state penitentiary.304 Overcrowding in the state prison, treating mental
illness for jail inmates, and finding effective community alternatives are
issues that leaders across the state examine.305 This section will provide
insight into the issues in North Dakota relating to mentally ill offenders and
discuss the impact of problem-solving courts, such as MHCs, in the state.
According to the North Dakota Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (DOCR), the growth in prison population resulted in sending
298. Robert Bernstein & Tammy Seltzer, Criminalization of People With Mental Illnesses:
The Role of Mental Health Courts in System Reform, 7 U. D.C. L. REV. 143, 154-55 (2002).
299. Id. at 155.
300. Id. at 157. When determining the duration of court supervision, consideration should be
given to the treatment plan and “should never exceed the typical sentence and probationary period
for the underlying criminal charge.” Id.
301. See generally Stefan & Winick, supra note 209, at 510-24 (providing arguments for and
against the implementation of MHCs).
302. See generally id. (discussing the importance of finding alternatives to incarceration for
mentally ill offenders).
303. Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 298, at 143.
304. See N.D. LEGIS. COUNCIL, MINUTES OF COMM’N ON ALTERNATIVES TO
INCARCERATION, at 1-3 (Mar. 21-22, 2006), available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/592005/interim-info/minutes/ca032106minutes.pdf [hereinafter ALTERNATIVES, March 2006]
(discussing the rise in inmate population at the state prison and the rise in mentally ill offenders in
jail).
305. Id. at 1-2.
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inmates to be housed in jails or other private prison facilities.306 North
Dakota had the highest increase in prison growth in the nation during
2003.307 In April 2005, the state prison experienced an all time high of
1386 inmates.308 Approximately thirty-seven percent of the inmate population in North Dakota have an Axis I mental disorder.309 In response to
these statistics, the prison system has begun to examine ways to reduce the
increase in inmate population.310
The Field Services Department of the North Dakota Department of
Corrections has worked to develop strategies and create diversions to prison
incarceration.311 Programs such as the Last Chance Program and the
Halfway House are examples of programs established to confront the issues
relating to offenders within the community.312 The Last Chance Program
offers a drug treatment program to offenders who have “violated the
conditions of supervision by using drugs or alcohol.”313 By choosing to
participate in the program, offenders who successfully complete the
program can avoid incarceration.314 Also, the Halfway House program
places offenders in a halfway house as an intermediate sanction or for
parole and probation purposes and provides specialized treatment
programs.315 The Drug Court Program was also established to provide a
diversion to prison incarceration for offenders with drug and substance
abuse problems.316 Drug courts are problem-solving courts with similar

306. N.D. DEP’T. OF CORR. & REHAB., BIENNIAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR OF NORTH
DAKOTA 2003-05, § PRISONS DIV. REPORT at 6 (2005), available at http://www.state.nd.us/
docr/docr/BiennialReport03-05.pdf [hereinafter DOCR].
307. Id. at 9. The inmate population was increased by approximately eleven percent in 2003.
Id. With expectations of further population growth, the prison officials are concerned about the
need for more prison cells. Id.
308. Id. at 6.
309. E-mail from Leann K. Bertsch, Dir. of N.D. Dep’t of Corrections, to Andrea M.
Odegaard (Oct. 2, 2006, 11:29:30 CST) (on file with author); see DSM IV, supra note 218 and
accompanying text (indicating that Axis I mental illnesses include major mental disorders,
learning disabilities, and developmental disabilities).
310. See ALTERNATIVES, March 2006, supra note 304, at 1. “Although the increasing need
for prison beds is widespread throughout the country, . . . alternative programs that provide
treatment and rehabilitation are a good alternative to incarcerating certain prisoners in high
security prisons and ultimately lead to cost-savings.” Id.
311. DOCR, supra note 306, § Field Services Div. Report at 5. “Alternatives to incarceration programs serve as cost-effective measures in lieu of incarceration to promote pro-social
change in offender behavior while holding the offender accountable to their community.” Id.
312. Id. at 7-8.
313. Id. at 8.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 7
316. Id. at 8.
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features to those of MHCs.317 However, drug courts focus on offenders
charged with drug or alcohol related crimes.318
In addition to the problem of overcrowding in the prison, county jails
across the state are concerned with mentally ill offenders trapped in the
“revolving door” process.319 The treatment of mentally ill offenders in jail
can be expensive.320 For example, the Cass County Jail in Fargo, North
Dakota spends an average of eight thousand dollars per month for offenders
in the jail with mental illness.321 Generally, the money spent on inmates
with mental illnesses comes from the jail budget.322 In a typical week at the
Cass County Jail, one-fifth to a one-third of the inmates is on medication
for mental illnesses.323 In addition, these offenders create a majority of the
work for jail staff.324 Even when the mentally ill inmates are in the
minority of the jail population, the jail staff spends the majority of their
time working with the mentally ill inmates.325 With an increase in mentally
ill jail inmates, the Cass County Jail has examined options to reduce the
incarceration of these individuals and provide options for receiving
treatment in the community.326
In April 2005, the North Dakota Legislature created a commission on
alternatives to incarceration.327 The purpose of the commission was to
“study sentencing alternatives, mandatory sentences, treatment options, the
expanded use of problem-solving courts, home monitoring, and other
related issues.”328 The North Dakota Legislature created the commission to
317. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 6. Both courts use team approaches and
include professionals from different disciplines, such as mental health or addiction counselors. Id.
318. Id. at 7. Monitoring in drug courts typically involves drug testing, whereas MHCs do
not have a specific test to determine whether the participant is adhering to the treatment plan. Id.
319. Tom Pantera, County Jailers Do What They Can, THE FARGO FORUM (N.D.), May 5,
2006, at A1, A10. Often, individuals go back to jail as a result of failing to take medications for
their mental illness and self-medicating themselves with drugs and alcohol which, in turn,
influences their likelihood of committing crimes. Id. at A10.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. See id. (“The most common psychiatric disorders among inmates are antisocial
personality disorder . . . and depression and anxiety.”).
324. Id.; see Budget Blamed for Failure to Treat Mentally Ill, CORRECTIONS PROF., Aug. 11,
2003, at 21 (indicating that a jail in South Carolina began putting mentally ill inmates on a waiting
list to receive treatment).
325. Pantera, supra note 319, at A10. Often referred to as the 20-80 rule, when twenty
percent of the jail population is comprised of people who are mentally ill, eighty percent of the jail
staff’s time is spent working with those inmates. Id.
326. ALTERNATIVES, March 2006, supra note 304, at 2 (discussing the establishment of the
Jail Intervention Coordinating Committee in Cass County as a way to identify what can be done to
provide a diversion from incarceration for mentally ill individuals).
327. N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-35-24 (2005).
328. Id.
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provide “information and recommendations for the governor’s consideration in time for inclusion of the recommendations in the biennial executive
budget.”329 In March 2006, the commission heard about the possibility of a
jail-based diversion project introduced by the Jail Intervention Coordinating
Committee of Cass County (JICC).330 The JICC studied effective ways to
reduce the number of incarcerations of offenders with mental illness.331
The project proposed involved a program focused on mentally ill individuals booked for a crime in which the “behavior can be addressed without
incarceration.”332 The JICC recognized that the proposed project was
similar to a MHC.333 However, the project is jail-based, rather than courtbased like a MHC.334 The JICC submitted an application to receive a
federal grant for the program from the Bureau of Justice.335 In September
2006, the Commission on Alternatives to Incarceration recommended to
Governor Hoeven that the inclusion of $582,000 in the executive budget
should be used in assisting the JICC in implementing its project.336 The
receipt of these funds would be contingent on receiving the federal grant for
the project.337
In addition to concerns raised by officials within the North Dakota
prison and jail systems, the judiciary also voiced concerns about the influx
of mentally ill offenders appearing before the courts across the state.338
Former North Dakota Supreme Court Justice, William A. Neumann, commented that therapeutic justice and “problem-solving courts” have proliferated with a “more proactive role for courts in dealing with underlying

329. Id.
330. ALTERNATIVES, March 2006, supra note 304, at 1-2. The JICC is composed of mental
health professionals, criminal justice officials, and legislators who are interested in reducing
incarceration of individuals with mental illness. Id. at 2.
331. Id. at 2.
332. Id.
333. Id. (testimony from the JICC at 5-6).
334. Id.
335. N.D. LEGIS. COUNCIL, MINUTES OF COMM’N ON ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION,
at 1 (June 20, 2006) (testimony from the JICC at 1), available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/
assembly/59-2005/interim-info/minutes/ca062006minutes.pdf.
336. N.D. LEGIS. COUNCIL, MINUTES OF COMM’N ON ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION,
at 5 (Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/59-2005/interiminfo/minutes/ca090606minutes.pdf [hereinafter ALTERNATIVES, Sept. 2006]. Senator Robinson
indicated that “it is clear that there are too few individuals in treatment and too many incarcerated . . . something must be done to provide flexibility for admitting an individual for treatment
rather than incarcerating the individual.” Id. at 4.
337. Id. at 5.
338. See N.D. SUPREME CT., JUDICIAL PLANNING COMM., MEETING MINUTES (Apr. 26,
2002), http://www.court.state.nd.us/_court/committees/jud_plan/minutesapr2002.htm (noting that
there is an increasing interest in problem-solving courts to address underlying problems with
cases).
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problems associated with cases.”339 Further, analyzing the appropriateness
of specific programs involving therapeutic justice is necessary to measure
the impact it could have on the judicial system.340 Chief Justice Gerald
VandeWalle voiced concern about taking on additional workloads involved
in specialized courts.341 Since problem-solving courts are “heavy users of
judicial time,” it would be necessary to provide more judges to effectively
operate these types of courts.342 Without sufficient resources, the effectiveness of problem-solving courts would be undermined.343
VII. CONCLUSION
Because mentally ill offenders are entering the criminal justice system
at an alarming rate, courts are considering alternative approaches to adjudicate cases where the underlying problem is mental illness.344 Therapeutic
jurisprudence and problem-solving courts provide examples of how court
structures and judicial practices have been redesigned to support a
restorative and rehabilitative system.345 With collaboration from mental
health and criminal justice systems, the legal process that mentally ill
offenders confront can be designed to prevent further judicial intervention
and provide offenders with an opportunity to be productive members of
society.346 The establishment of MHCs is one way that therapeutic jurisprudence has expanded the role of courts to include a rehabilitative
process.347 Moreover, like many parts of the country, North Dakota is
addressing the issue of mentally ill offenders who are trapped in the
“revolving door.”348 By examining why this problem has occurred, what
states are doing about it, and how the courts have evolved as a result, states
can decide whether the value and impact of these innovative courts is an

339. Id.
340. Id.
341. N.D. SUPREME CT., STATE OF THE JUDICIARY MESSAGE (2002), http://www.court.
state.nd.us/_court/news/barjudiciary2002.htm.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 7.
345. Winick, supra note 6, at 1090.
346. Id. at 1060-61.
347. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 1 (noting that MHCs are a response
to a “broad systemic problem” created by the overwhelming amount of individuals with mental
illness in the criminal justice system).
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